In this paper, we consider fuzzy bimatrix games with fuzzy payoffs. Based on fuzzy max order, for such games, we define three kinds of concepts of minim ax equilibrium strategies. Some basic results obtained.
Introduction
Since seminal works by Neumann-Morgenstern(J. VonNeunann, 1994) and Nash(J.F. Nash., 1950 & J.F.Nash., 1951 , Game theory has played an important role in the fields of decision making theory such as economics, management, and operations research, etc. When we apply the game theory to model some practical problems which we encounter in real situations, we have to know the values of payoffs exactly. However, it is difficult to know the exact values of payoffs and we could only know the values of payoffs approximately. In such situations, it is useful to model the problems as games with fuzzy payoffs. In this case, since the expected payoffs of the game should be fuzzy-valued, there are no concepts of equilibrium strategies to be accepted widely. So, it is an important task to define the concept of equilibrium strategies and investigate their properties. In this paper, we consider fuzzy bimatrix games, namely, the games where the number of players are two and fuzzy payoffs. For such a game, we shall define three kinds of concepts of minim ax equilibrium strategies.
Preliminary
Let R n be n-dimensional Euclidean space, and x = (x 1 , x 2 , · · · , x n ) T ∈ R n be any vector, where x i ∈ R, i = 1, 2, · · · , n and T denotes the transpose of the vector. For any two vectors x, y ∈ R n , we write x ≥ y if x i ≥ y i , i = 1, 2, · · · , n, x > y and x y, respectively. Definition 2.1 Let m be any real number and let h be any positive number. A fuzzy numberã whose membership function is given by the following formula
is called a symmetric triangular fuzzy number, and we denote the set of all symmetric triangular fuzzy numbers by F T .
Real numbers m and h are called the center and the deviation parameter ofã, respectively. Since any symmetric triangular fuzzy numberã is characterized by the center m and the deviation parameter h ofã we denote the symmetric triangular fuzzy numberã byã ≡ (m, h) T .
Letã be any fuzzy number and let α ∈ [0, 1] be any real number.
where cal denotes the closure of sets.
¢ www.ccsenet.org/jmr ISSN: 1916-9795 Since
For any two fuzzy numbersã,b ∈ F T , we introduce three kinds of binary relations.
Definition 2.2 For any symmetric triangular fuzzy numbersã,b ∈ F T , we writẽ
We call binary relations , and a strict fuzzy max order and a strong fuzzy max order, respectively.
T be any symmetric triangular fuzzy numbers. Then, it holds that
3. Two-person zero-sum game with fuzzy payoffs and its equilibrium strategy
Let I, J denote players and let M = {1, 2, · · · , m}, N = {1, 2, · · · , n} be the sets of all pure strategies available for player I, and J, respectively. We denote the sets of all mixed strategies available for player I, and J by
we denote the payoff that player I receives and J loses when player I plays the pure strategy i and player J plays the pure strategy i. Then we have the fuzzy payoff matrix
we call this game two-person fuzzy zero bimatrix game, and we denote it bỹ
is said to be a minim ax equilibrium strategies to GameΓ if it holds that
(1) x TÃ y * x * TÃ y * ∀x ∈ X (2) x * TB y x * TB y * ∀y ∈ Y Definition 3.2 A point (x * , y * ) ∈ X × Y us said to be a non-dominated minim ax equilibrium strategy to Gamẽ Γ if it holds that
(1) There exist no x ∈ X such that x * TÃ y * x TÃ y * (2) There exist no y ∈ Y such that x * TB y * x * TB y Definition 3.3 A point (x * , y * ) ∈ X × Y is said to be a weak non-dominated minim ax equilibrium strategy to GameΓ if it holds that
(1) There exist no x ∈ X such that x * TÃ y * ≺ x TÃ y * (2) There exist no y ∈ Y such that x * TB y * ≺ x * TB y By definition, it is obvious that the following relationship holds among these definitions.
(1) If a strategy (x * , y * ) is a minim ax equilibrium strategy to GameΓ, it is a non-dominated minim ax equilibrium strategy.
(2)If a strategy (x * , y * ) is a non-dominated minim ax equilibrium strategy to GameΓ, it is a weak non-dominated minim ax strategy.
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Theorem 3.1 In order that a strategy (x * , y * ) ∈ X × Y be a minim ax equilibrium strategy to GameΓ, it is necessary and sufficient that, for all x ∈ X, y ∈ Y
Hold.
Proof. Let (x * , y * ) ∈ X × Y be any minim ax equilibrium strategy to GameΓ. Then from Theorem 2.1, for all x ∈ X, y ∈ Y we have |x * T Hy
By expanding and rearranging (5), we have
On the other hand, by expanding and rearranging (6), we have
From (7) to (10), we have (1), (2), (3), and (4).
Theorem 3.1 shows that players I, J faces a pair of two-person zero-sum games with crisp payoffs (1), (2), (3),(4), we have x T A y * ≤ x * T A y * , and x * T By ≤ x * T By * . Theorem 3.2 In order that a strategy (x * , y * ) ∈ X × Y be a non-dominated minim ax equilibrium strategy to GameΓ, it is necessary and sufficient that the following conditions holds:
(1) There is no x ∈ Y such that x * T Ay * ≤ x T Ay * holds.
(2) There is no y ∈ Y such that x * T By * ≤ x * T By holds.
Proof. Let (x * , y * ) ∈ X × Y be a non-dominated minim ax equilibrium strategy to GameΓ. First, we suppose that there exists a strategy x ∈ X such that x * T Ay * ≤ x T Ay * holds. By definition, we have
By rearranging (11) : 1916-9795 this implies that x * TÃ y * x TÃ y * holds. This is a contradiction.
Next, we suppose that there exists a strategy y ∈ Y such that x * T By * ≤ x * T By holds. By definition, we have
By rearranging (12), we have
T this implies that x * T By * ≤ x * T By holds. Therefore, for all α ∈ [0, 1], we have
T this implies that x * T By * x * T By. This is a contradiction.
Conversely, let (x * , y * ) be any strategy to GameΓ such that conditions (1) and (2) hold.
First, we suppose that there exists strategy x ∈ X such that x * TÃ y * x TÃ y * holds. Then, by definition 2.2, we have (
T this is a contradiction.
Next, we suppose that there exists a strategy y ∈ Y such that x * TB y * x * TB y holds. Then, by Definition 2.2, we have (
By a similar way, we have the following theorem.
Theorem 3.3 In order that a strategy (x * , y * ) ∈ X × Y be a weak non-dominated minim ax equilibrium strategy to GameΓ, it is necessary and sufficient that the following conditions hold:
(1) there is no x ∈ X such that x * T Ay * < x T Ay * holds.
(2) there is no y ∈ Y such that x * T By * < x * T Byholds Theorem 3.4 we have the following conclusion:
(1) There is a non-dominated minim ax equilibrium strategy to GameΓ at least.
(2) There is a weak non-dominated minim ax equilibrium strategy to GameΓ at least.
